owlsbooks Chapter 2293
Chapter 2293
Chapter 2293
Those old fogies are afraid of even the Valkyries, let alone Sif, who is an even more subversive being.
Vostagg might understand himself, but what good would that do?
She was destined never to go back.
And more importantly, Sif had no intention of going back!
What are you going back for?
She is free!
Sif's divine ascension allowed her to see a wider world. She was indeed a god of Asgard, but no one had ever said that they had to stay in Asgard!
She wants to go for a walk!
Since that's the case, why bother responding?
That will only cause trouble for both parties.
Lacha!
Above the control center, the hidden chains cracked crisply.
Sif has deactivated the control protocol!
"It's done!!!"
Sif shouted!
Gel's eyes lit up, and he instantly teleported to Sif's side.
"Can we leave now?!"
Geer can't wait any longer!
"Of course!"
Sif said with a smile.
Her smile felt unfamiliar to Vostagg.
It was so carefree, so relaxed, so...happy!
At that moment, Vostagg suddenly realized that he had never truly understood his child... Vostagg treated Thor and the others as his own children.
This is a very presumptuous statement.
But that's exactly what Vostagg thought.
Volstagg has many children... a fact that is legendary in Asgard.
To be honest, the birth rate of Asgardians is not very high.
In the ancient tribal era, things were better. In order to survive, almost every family tried their best to leave as many offspring as possible, because only in this way could the species continue to reproduce!
There was no other way; in tribal times, children were the very means of production.
The specific details of the Asgardian tribal era are difficult for us modern people to describe, but these things can be applied to Earth as well.
In many underdeveloped regions of the world, a 12-year-old cowherd can be worth half a laborer, and a 15-year-old girl can bring in dowry money when she marries. Having more children means having more "risk hedging." In war-torn South Sudan, children are even more of a "human shield"—in tribal conflicts, the family with more members has more leverage. But this raises a fundamental question: when mechanized agriculture replaces manual labor, when social security nets cover old age, and when education investment becomes a bottomless pit, children go from "assets" to "liabilities," so why do people in developed countries still have children?
This is the famous economics of fertility!
Economic theory posits that an individual's decision to purchase a good and the quantity purchased depend on the good's price and the benefits of acquiring it, as well as on a comparison of the price and benefits of that good with other available goods. People's reproductive decisions also undergo a similar rational selection process. When making reproductive decisions, individuals calculate the costs and benefits of having children, thus determining whether to have children and how many. Therefore, many scholars have analyzed reproductive decisions from an economic perspective, developing a series of economic theories about fertility.
Leibenstein was a pioneer in microeconomic population economics. He was the first to introduce economic concepts and theories into the study of fertility, establishing a microeconomic model of fertility and constructing the "cost-utility theory of children," thus paving a new path for research in population economics. He argued that the cost of children refers to the economic and time costs that families spend on raising and educating their children, including direct and indirect costs. Direct costs include expenses for pregnancy and childbirth, the child's food, clothing, shelter, education, medical care, cultural and recreational activities, and subsidies provided to support the child's marriage.
Based on the cost-utility analysis of children, Leibenstein constructed the "marginal child rational choice model" by analyzing marginal child utility. Marginal child utility refers to the utility of the last child born to parents. The marginal utility of a child follows the law of diminishing marginal utility of general goods. Different families will choose whether to have children and how many children to have based on the utility and costs brought by the children.
Economist Becker, based on utility maximization theory, applied consumer behavior theory to family fertility decisions, analyzing family demand for children and creating a theory of family economics. He argued that, unlike goods purchased in the market, children are family-produced goods. A family's fertility decision depends on the net cost of a child. When the net cost is greater than zero, parents can obtain psychological utility from the child, in which case the child is equivalent to a durable consumer good; conversely, when the net cost is less than zero, parents can obtain cash benefits from the child, in which case the child is equivalent to a durable good. The main factors influencing the price of children are: First, the greater the contribution a child makes to the family, the lower the cost of raising a child, thus the lower the relative price of the number of children, and the greater the demand for the number of children; second, the lower the prices of the necessities for raising children (such as clothing, food, and housing), the lower the cost of raising children, the lower the relative price of children, and the higher the demand for children; third, the higher the opportunity cost of raising children, the higher the price of children, and the lower the demand for the quantity.
Subsequently, they constructed the quantity-quality substitution theory of children, arguing that the quality of a child refers to their physical and intellectual abilities, excluding their moral character. High-quality children can bring parents greater benefits and psychological satisfaction, providing more utility. They divided the cost of children into quantity costs and quality costs. Quantity costs are the material and human resources spent on children, unrelated to their quality, also known as "fixed costs," which include the mother's opportunity cost from conception, risk-bearing costs, delivery costs, and the child's consumption costs. Quality costs refer to the material and human resources spent on children, unrelated to their quantity; this part is variable, also known as "variable costs," including the child's education costs, medical costs, training expenses, and the opportunity cost parents incur in improving the child's quality. Based on the above analysis and combined with consumer theory, they viewed the quantity and quality of children as two substitute goods, thus showing a strong negative correlation between them. When a family's income increases, they will increase their investment in both the quantity and quality of their children; however, the quantity elasticity of demand is lower than the quality elasticity, therefore the demand for quality grows faster than the demand for quantity.
Other scholars have applied supply and demand theories to study changes in fertility rates, expanding the analysis of fertility issues to a macro perspective. They focus on global fertility revolutions and demographic transitions, examining changes in fertility rates in conjunction with social and economic modernization processes. Their focus extends beyond the long-term decline in fertility rates in developed countries to include the high fertility rates and their causes in developing countries. The supply and demand theory forms the theoretical foundation for their fertility policy reforms. Their proposed theory of a fertility revolution includes the following aspects: First, the essence of demographic transition is a fertility revolution. Second, the connotation of the fertility revolution should be understood from the perspective of overall social modernization. Third, a preliminary exploration of changes in fertility control methods has been conducted. Demographic transition and the fertility revolution are not merely changes in fertility levels and quantities, but fundamental changes in fertility attitudes and behaviors. The fundamental reason for declining fertility rates is a shift in self-awareness, from social or physiological coercion to the conscious and free choice of the fertility subject. The most fundamental essence of the fertility revolution lies in the transformation of the fertility subject's attitudes and behaviors.
According to the "supply-demand" model, child demand refers to the number of surviving children parents want when the cost of birth control is close to zero. In other words, it's the number of children a couple wants without considering the economic and psychological costs of birth control, and this is related to family preferences, income, and the cost of raising children. Child supply refers to the number of children a couple can have without limiting family size; this number is determined by natural fertility and the survival probability of children. Adjusting the cost of fertility includes both the economic and psychological costs of adjusting fertility. The core of supply-demand theory is: first, child demand and child supply; second, the motivation and cost of couples controlling fertility; and third, the natural fertility rate versus conscious birth control. The comparison between child supply and demand is a crucial factor influencing the motivation for birth control. Child demand, child supply, and the cost of adjusting fertility are the three key factors determining the fertility rate. They consider the motivation for birth control a significant factor influencing the fertility revolution and link it to the modernization process. In the modernization process, the supply and demand of children are mainly affected by the following factors: public health and medical conditions, the role of education and public media, the impact of urbanization, the emergence and impact of new commodities, and the impact of family planning policies. The key factors influencing family fertility rates are the supply and demand for children. The process of modernization has both positive and negative impacts on the supply and demand of children. Therefore, modernization will alter the supply and demand relationship for children, triggering a "fertility revolution."
Another theory is the wealth flow theory, where "wealth flow" refers to the money, goods, services, and guarantees that an individual gives to others. Focusing on "wealth flow" rather than "wealth" emphasizes that it is not limited to currency. In his view, the study of wealth flow is fundamental to understanding the intrinsic connections within families at any time and place.
The main points of the wealth flow theory are: First, the revolution in family relationships, especially the revolution in intergenerational wealth flow, is a crucial reason for demographic shifts and the change in fertility rates from high to low and from rising to falling. Specifically, this involves a fundamental change in the direction and amount of wealth flow between parents and children. The core issue is whether family wealth flows from generation to generation or from generation to generation.
Second, the fundamental issue of demographic and fertility rate shifts lies in the net flow of wealth between generations, specifically the net flow of wealth between parents and children, known as the "net wealth flow." The direction of this "net wealth flow"—whether it flows to parents or children—is crucial; specifically, is the wealth flow more from children to parents or from parents to children? Different net wealth flows have entirely different impacts on changes in fertility rates.
Third, the intergenerational flow of net wealth differs significantly between primitive, traditional, and modern societies. In primitive and traditional societies, net wealth flowed from children to parents, but in modern society, the flow has reversed, from parents to children. In primitive and traditional societies, children bore responsibilities such as labor, caring for elderly parents, supporting the family, and continuing the family line, all of which encouraged people to have more children. In modern society, however, children largely no longer bear these responsibilities, resulting in lower income for them and a shift of net wealth from families to children, thus leading to a preference for lower birth rates.
In addition, people's ideas are also changing.
Human emotions are finite. Like many years ago, in our elders' generation, families typically had many children, but parents clearly didn't shower all their attention on every single one. In fact, they often let the older children raise the younger ones rather roughly. But what about now?
Having too many children means that parents need to devote more time and energy.
Because fairness is valued nowadays.
The same applies to Asgard. It is indeed a paradise, but that doesn't mean that everything there is invalid. On the contrary, those logics still apply.
Precisely because it is heaven, people have plenty of time to do more interesting things, so who would spend so much time raising children? You know, Asgardians have a very, very long lifespan, which also means that raising children takes a very, very long time!
So no matter how anxious Odin and the elders were, the birth rate of the Asgardians was never really ideal.
Otherwise, Asgard's population wouldn't be so small.
Furthermore, according to the law that the stronger an organism is, the fewer offspring it produces, the Asgardians themselves are not particularly fertile... at least compared to humans.
But Vostagg was different; he had many children.
Three of them are already grown up, and there are seven more babies in the family who are still hungry... Even with human reproductive capacity, a family with ten children is quite extraordinary. In Asgard, it's even more outrageous.
Otherwise, why do you think Odin didn't give Toldor a few more siblings, and instead adopted Loki?
This means they can't give birth.
Even Odin's family is the normal one, with one or two children per family.
Vostagg loved children, not just his own; he treated almost all children the same.
Of course, Volstagg put a lot of effort into Thor and the others, although he was reluctant to admit it, these kids were much more talented than his own little ones.
He believed he knew them very well.
But seeing Sif's smile, he suddenly realized that he didn't seem to know her that well.
In the past, Sif was always very proper in everything she did. Even her smiles were different. She rarely laughed like other Asgardians. Even when she was happy, she would only stand next to Thor and show a proper and just-right smile. In many people's eyes, this was the dignity and restraint that royalty should have.
Even when I'm very happy, I won't be particularly unrestrained.
Vostagg thought so too.